An efficient implementation of the decoy-state
  measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with heralded
  single-photon sources by Wang, Qin & Wang, Xiang-Bin
ar
X
iv
:1
30
5.
64
80
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
5 O
ct 
20
13
An efficient implementation of the decoy-state
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with
heralded single-photon sources
Qin Wang1∗ and Xiang-Bin Wang2,3†
1Institute of Signal Processing and Transmission,
Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China
2Department of Physics and State Key Laboratory of Low Dimensional Quantum Physics,
Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China and
3Jinan Institute of Quantum Technology,
Shandong Academy of Information Technology, Jinan, China
Abstract
We study the decoy-state measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution using her-
alded single-photon sources. This has the advantage that the observed error rate in X basis is in
higher order and not so large. We calculate the key rate and transmission distance for two cases:
one using only triggered events, and the other using both triggered and non-triggered events. We
compare the key rates of various protocols and find that our new scheme using triggered and non-
triggered events can give higher key rate and longer secure distance. Moreover, we also show the
different behavior of our scheme when using different heralded single-photon sources, i.e., in poisson
or thermal distribution. We demonstrate that the former can generate a relatively higher secure
key rate than the latter, and can thus work more efficiently in practical quantum key distributions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As is well known that the quantum key distribution (QKD) is standing out compared
with conventional cryptography due to its unconditional security based on the law of physics.
It allows two legitimate users, say Alice and Bob, to share secret keys even under the
present of a malicious eavesdropper, Eve. But its security proofs often contain certain
assumptions either on the sources or on the detection systems, and usually practical setups
have imperfections. Therefore, the ”in-principle” unconditional security can actually conflict
with realistic implementations, and which might be exploited by Eve to hack the system
[1–4].
In order to achieve the final goal of unconditional security in practice, different approaches
have been proposed, such as the decoy-state method [5–9], the device-independent quantum
key distribution (DI-QKD) [10, 11] and recently the measurement-device-independent quan-
tum key distribution (MDI-QKD) [12, 13]. Among them, the decoy-state MDI-QKD seems
to be a promising candidate considering its relatively lower technical demanding.
The decoy-state MDI-QKD was studied extensively with infinite different intensities[12]
and a few intensities[15]. However, the efficient decoy-state MDI-QKD with heralded source
is not shown. We know that weak coherent states (WCSs) at least have two drawbacks: one
is the large vacuum component, and the other is the significant multi-photon probabilities.
The former leads to a rather limited transmission distance, since the dark count contributes
lots of bit-flip errors for long distance. The latter one results in a quite low key generation
rate. In the existing MDI-QKD [12, 13] setup, all detections are done in Z basis. There
are events of two incident photons presenting on the same side of the beam-splitter and no
incident photon on another side. Such a case can cause a quite high observed error rate
in X basis. Though in principle one can deduce the phase-flip error rate by comparison
of the observed error rate in X basis for different groups of pulses as shown in [15], the
high error rate in X basis can still decrease the key rate drastically in real implementations
when we take statistical fluctuations into account. Fortunately, besides the WCSs, there is
another practically easy implementable source, the heralded single-photon source (HSPS).
The source can eliminate those drawbacks, and give much better performance than WCSs in
the QKD [16, 17], since the dark count can be eliminated to a negligible level for a triggered
source. Moreover, the cause of a high error rate in X basis does not exist for a HSPS due
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to a high order small probability for events of two photons present on the same side of the
beam-splitter.
We also note that it is impossible to use infinite number of decoy states in a realistic
MDI-QKD, therefore, people often use one or two decoy states to estimate the behavior of
the vacuum, the single-photon and the multi-photon states [8, 16].
Here in this work, we study MDI-QKD with heralded single-photon sources. We use both
the triggered and non-triggered events of HSPSs to precisely estimate the lower bound of
the two-single-photon contribution (Y11) and the upper bound of the quantum bit-error rate
(QBER) of two-single-photon pulses (e11). As a result, we get an much longer transmission
distance and a much higher key generation rate compared with existing decoy-state MDI-
QKD methods [15], and come close to the result of infinite different intensities. After
presenting the schematic set-up of the method, we shall present formulas such as Y11 and
e11 for calculating the key rate in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we proceed numerical simulations
with practical parameters and compare with existing schemes. Finally, we give conclusions
in Sec IV.
II. IMPROVED METHOD OF DECOY-STATE MDI-QKD WITH HERALDED
SOURCE
A. The method and formulas
We know that the state of a two-mode field from the parametric-down conversion (PDC)
source is [18, 19]:
|Ψ〉TS =
∞∑
n=0
√
Pn |n〉T |n〉S
Pn(x) =
xn
(1 + x)n+1
, (∆tc ≫ ∆t)
or
Pn(x) = e
−xx
n
n!
, (∆tc ≪ ∆t)
where |n〉 represents an n-photon state, and x is the intensity (average photon number)
of one mode. Mode T (trigger) is detected by Alice or Bob, and mode S (signal) is sent
out to the untrusted third party (UTP). ∆tc is the coherence time of the emission, and
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FIG. 1: (Color online) (a). A schematic setup of the method. Alice and Bob randomly prepare
HSPSs from PDC processes in a BB84 polarization state with a polarization rotator (PR). Decoy
states are generated by changing the power of each pump laser with a modulator (MD). Signal
pulses from Alice and Bob interfere at a 50/50 beam-splitter (BS) and then each enter a polar-
izing beam splitter (PBS) projecting the input photons into either horizontal (H) or vertical (V)
polarization states. Four single-photon detectors are employed at the third party, Charlie’s side to
detect the results. Moreover, both the triggered and non-triggered events at Alice and Bob’s side
are sent to Charlie, and corresponding counting rates are recorded individually.
∆t is the duration of the pump pulse. As demonstrated in [20, 21], we can either get a
thermal distribution or a poisson distribution by adjusting the experimental conditions, e.g.
changing the duration of the pump pulses. Below, we will at first use HSPSs with poisson
distributions as an example to describe our new MDI-QKD scheme, and then compare it
with the case of with thermal distributions.
We denote qυn as the probability of triggering at Alice or Bob’s detector when n-photon
state is emitted,
qv0 = dυ
and
qυn = 1− (1− dv)(1− ηυ)
n,
for i > 1. Here υ can be A (Alice) or B (Bob), ηυ and dυ are the detection efficiency
and the dark count rate at Alice (Bob)’s side, respectively. For simplicity, we may omit
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the superscript or subscript v latter if there is no confusion. Then the corresponding non-
triggering probability is (1− qn).
We request Alice (or Bob) to randomly change the intensity of her (or his) pump light
among three values, so that the intensity of one mode is randomly changed among 0, µA
(or µB), and µ
′
A (or µ
′
B) (and µA < µ
′
A, µB < µ
′
B). We define the subclass of source
pulses that Alice uses intensity x, Bob uses intensity y as source {x, y}, x ∈ {0, µA, µ
′
A} and
y ∈ {0, µB, µ
′
B}. After triggering detection, there are 4 classes of states at each side from the
two-mode fields of two different intensities, as there are triggered and non-triggered states
from each intensity. In principle, here we have many choices in implementing the decoy-state
MDI-QKD. For example, using all events in both intensities; using only triggered events of
them; or using triggered events in one intensity and non-triggered events in another. Here
we shall study the following two cases: 1) using only triggered events in both intensities; 2)
using non-triggered events from the stronger field and triggered events from the weaker field
for the estimation of Y11, and then using the triggered events from the stronger pulses for the
final key distillation. We declare that: Firstly, both cases can lead to a longer transmission
distance than that of using WCSs; Secondly, both the key rate and the secure transmission
distance in the second case are better than that in the first case.
As shown in [12], we use the rectilinear basis (Z) as the key generation basis, and the
diagonal basis (X) for error testing only. We denote Y W,tmn , S
W,t
mn , and e
W,t
mn to be the yield, the
gain and the QBRE of the triggered signals respectively, where n, m represent the number
of photons sent by Alice and Bob, and W represent the Z or X basis. Similarly, we also
define Y W,ntmn , S
W,nt
mn , and e
W,nt
mn as corresponding values for the non-triggered events. Note
that the gain SW,tx,y is defined as n
W,t
x,y /N
W
x,y, if n
W,t
x,y and N
W
x,y are the number of detected events
after triggering at both side and the number of total events (no matter triggered or not)
among the subclass of source pulses that Alice uses intensity x, Bob uses intensity y and
both of them are prepared in basis W . Similar definition is also used for SW,ntx,y , the gain of
non-triggered sources in basis W . All gains can be directly experimentally observed, and
thus are regarded as known values. The yield {Y W,tmn } is defined as the the rate of producing
a successful event for two-pulse state |m〉⊗ |n〉 prepared in W basis after triggering. Similar
definition is also used for non-triggered pulses. Asymptotically, we have Y W,tmn = Y
W,nt
mn .
Therefore we shall only use Y Wmn for both of them. Note the the yield of Y
W
mn is not directly
observed in the experiment and our first major task is to deduce the lower bound of Y W11
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based on the known values, {SW,txy }, {S
W,nt
xy }. Here we assume to implement the decoy-state
method in different bases separately, therefore we shall omit the superscript W here after
provided that this does not make any confusion.
The un-normalized density matrix for a triggered event from intensity two-mode field of
intensity r is
ρtr =
(
∞∑
0
qnPn(r) |n〉 〈n|
)
. (1)
Also, we have the following density matrix for a non-triggered event at Alice’s side
ρntr =
(
∞∑
0
(1− qn)Pn(r) |n〉 〈n|
)
. (2)
Using conclusions in Ref. [15], we can obtain the yield of single-photon pairs once we know
the source state. For triggered events, we have
Stx,y = S˜
t
00 + ηAηBxe
−xye−yY11 + ηAxe
−x
∞∑
n=2
[1− (1− ηB)
n]e−y
yn
n!
Y1n + ηBye
−y
∞∑
m=2
[1− (1− ηA)
m]
e−x
xm
m!
Ym1 +
∞∑
m=2,n=2
e−x
xm
m!
e−y
yn
n!
[1− (1− ηA)
m][1− (1− ηB)
n]Ymn.
(3)
Here S˜t00 = LA + LB − L0, and LA = dBe
−y
∞∑
m=0
[1− (1− dA)(1− ηA)
m]e−x x
m
m!
Ym0, LB =
dAe
−x
∞∑
n=0
[1− (1− dB)(1− ηB)
n]e−y y
n
n!
Y0n, L0 = dAdBe
−xe−yY00. According to the defini-
tion of the gains above, one easily finds that fact: LA = S
t
x0,LB = S
t
0y,L0 = S
t
00. All these
gains are known values. Therefore, S˜t00 = S
t
x0 + S
t
0y − S
t
00 is also a known value. Similarly,
we also have the following equation for the non-triggered events:
Sntx,y = S˜
nt
00 + (1− ηA)(1− ηB)xe
−xye−yY11 + (1− ηA)xe
−x
∞∑
n=2
(1− ηB)
ne−y
yn
n!
Y1n + (1− ηB)ye
−y
∞∑
m=2
(1− ηA)
me−x
xm
m!
Ym1 +
∞∑
m=2,n=2
e−x
xm
m!
e−y
yn
n!
(1− ηA)
m(1− ηB)
nYmn.
(4)
where S˜nt00 = S
nt
x0+ S
nt
0y −S
nt
00. And also S
nt
x0 = (1− dB)e
−y
∞∑
m=0
[(1− dA)(1− ηA)
m]e−x x
m
m!
Ym0,
Snt0y = (1 − dA)e
−x
∞∑
n=0
[(1− dB)(1− ηB)
n]e−y y
n
n!
Y0n, S
nt
00 = (1 − dA)(1 − dB)e
−xe−yY00. And
they are regarded as known values. Now let’s use Stµ,µ and S
nt
µ′,µ′ to estimate a tight bound
of Y11. Denoting k =
(1−ηA)(1−ηB)
2
ηA[1−(1−ηB)2]
(µ
′
µ
)3e2µ−2µ
′
, and combining Eq. (4) and (3), we obtain
Y11 =
k(Stµ,µ − S˜
t
00)− (S
nt
µ′,µ′ − S˜
nt
00) +K
[kηAηBµ2e−2µ − (1− ηA)(1− ηB)µ′2e−2µ
′ ]
(5)
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and
K =
∞∑
n=2
{(1− ηA)µ
′e−2µ
′
(1− ηB)
nµ
′n
n!
− kηAµe
−2µ[1− (1− ηB)
n]
µn
n!
}Y1n+
∞∑
m=2
{(1− ηB)µ
′e−2µ
′
(1− ηA)
mµ
′m
m!
− kηBµe
−2µ[1− (1− ηA)
m]
µm
m!
}Ym1+
∞∑
m=2,n=2
{(1− ηA)
m(1− ηB)
ne−2µ
′ µ′m
m!
µ′n
n!
− k[1− (1− ηA)
m][1− (1− ηB)
n]e−2µ
µm
m!
µn
n!
}Ymn.
(6)
To lower bound Y11 here, we can choose to set the following simultaneous conditions:
[kηAηBµ
2e−2µ − (1− ηA)(1− ηB)µ
′2e−2µ
′
] ≤ 0; K ≤ 0 (7)
When both conditions above are met, we have the following inequality for the lower band
of Y11:
Y11 > Y11
L ≡
k(Stµ,µ − S˜
t
00)− (S
nt
µ′,µ′ − S˜
nt
00)
[kηAηBµ2e−2µ − (1− ηA)(1− ηB)µ′2e−2µ
′ ]
. (8)
(since the value of µ and µ′ can be chosen separately, the above conditions can be easily
satisfied in practice,) In particular, in the symmetric case that ηA = ηB = η, the conditions
on Eq. (7) reduce to
µ ≥ (1− η)µ′. (9)
For simplicity, we shall use such a condition for all calculations. Actually, directly applying
Eq. (16) and Eq. (2) of Ref. [15] together with Eq. (1,2) here can also lead to Eq. (8,9).
Then the gain of the two-single-photon pulses for the triggered and non-triggered signals
(µ′) are:
St11 = η
2µ′2e−2µ
′
Y11, (10)
Snt11 = (1− η)
2µ′2e−2µ
′
Y11. (11)
As mentioned above, we use two bases in this protocol, i.e., the Z basis and the X basis.
We use the former to generate real keys, and the latter only for error test. After error test,
we get the bit-flip error rates for the triggered and non-triggered pulses as Etµ,µ and E
nt
µ′,µ′.
In order to calculate the final key rate, we also need to know the phase-flip error rate of
two-single-photon pulses in the Z basis, i.e. eph,t11 (or e
ph,nt
11 ) which is equal to the bit-flip rate
in the X basis, eX,t11 (or e
X,nt
11 ), whose values can be represented as:
eX,t11 6
EX,tµ,µS
X,t
µ,µ − E
X,t
µ,0S
X,t
µ,0 −E
X,t
0,µS
X,t
0,µ + E
X,t
0,0 S
X,t
0,0
Sω,t11
≡ eXa , (12)
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or
eX,nt11 6
EX,ntµ′,µ′S
X,nt
µ′,µ′ − E
X,nt
µ′,0 S
X,nt
µ′,0 − E
X,nt
0,µ′ S
X,nt
0,µ′ + E
X,nt
0,0 S
X,nt
0,0
Sω,nt11
≡ eXb . (13)
Combing the two bounds, we have [23]:
eX11 6 e
X,U
11 = min{e
X
a , e
X
b }. (14)
Now we can calculate the final key generation rate for the triggered signal pulses (µ′) as:
Rt > {q2P 21 (µ
′)Y Z,t11 [1−H2(e
X
11)]− S
Z,t
µ′,µ′f(E
Z,t
µ′,µ′)H2(E
Z,t
µ′,µ′)}, (15)
where f(Eµ′) is a factor for the cost of error correction given existing error correction systems
in practice, and we assume f = 1.16 here [12]. H2 (x) is the binary Shannon information
function, given by
H2 (x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
We have not considered the effects of bases mismatch in BB84 protocol. Actually, one can
choose basis in a biased way [26] and the effect can vanish asymptotically. In fact, the non-
triggered events and the triggered events from weaker fields can also be used to distill secret
keys as shown in [22]. However, for simplicity, in the following simulations we consider only
the triggered components from the stronger field.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
With formulas above, we can now numerically calculate the key rate and compare the
secret key generation rate of our new MDI-QKD scheme with existing methods [12, 15].
Moreover, we will show the different results of our proposed scheme using different HSPSs,
i.e., in poisson or thermal distributions. Below for simplicity, we assume that the UTP
locates in the middle of Alice and Bob, and the UTP’s detectors are identical, i.e., they have
the same dark count rate and detection efficiency, and their detection efficiency does not
depend on the incoming signals.
We shall estimate what values would probably be observed for the gains and error rates
in the normal cases by the linear model [12, 24] where state |n〉〈n| from Alice changes to
n∑
k=0
Cknη
k(1− η)n−k|k〉〈k|, (16)
8
TABLE I: Parameters used in numerical simulations: α is the channel loss, ed is the misalignment
probability, dc and ηc are the dark count rate and the detection efficiency per detector at the UTP’s
side, respectively.
where η is the transmittance from Alice to the UTP. Using this model, we can set values
(probably would-be observed values in experiments) for Stxy, S
nt
xy, E
t
xy and E
nt
xy according
to transmission distance. After setting these values, we can find the distance dependent
key rate by Eq. (15). For this purpose, we have developed a general model to simulate
the probably observed gains and error rates and hence the final key rate under linearly loss
channel, given whatever source state[24].
For a fair comparison, we use the same parameters as in [12, 25], see Table I, except that
Alice (Bob) uses an extra detector for heralding signals with a detection efficiency of ηA (ηB)
and dark count rate of dA (dB).
In practical implementations, people often use a non-degenerate PDC process and obtain
a visible and a telecommunication wavelength in mode T and S, respectively. To simplify the
simulations, we assume both Alice and Bob have the same silicon avalanche photodiodes. We
do calculation for the conditions of detection ηA = ηB = 0.75 (or 0.9), and dA = dB = 10
−6.
At each distance, in order to maximize the key generation rate, we set µ = (1 − η)µ′ and
use the optimal µ′ for the case of using both triggered and non-triggered events, for other
cases we set µ = 0.1 and use the optimal value of µ′. Our simulation results are shown in
Figs. 2 - 4.
Fig. 2(a) displays the comparison of the final key generation rate between different
schemes. The curve W0 is the case of using infinite decoy states with WCS [12], W1 repre-
sents Wang’s three decoy-state method with WCSs [15], H01 (or H02) shows the asymptotic
case with HSPSs, and H1 (or H2) represents the result of our new scheme with triggered
and non-triggered HSPSs. In the simulations above, we use the optimal values of µ′ at each
distance for all the curves. Just the difference is: For the asymptotic cases (W0, H01 and
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FIG. 2: (Color online) (a). Comparison of the final key generation rates vs distance between our
proposed scheme and the ones in Ref. [12] and Ref. [15]. W0: infinite intensities with WCS [12];
W1: three-intensity method with WCSs; H01 and H02: infinite intensities with HSPSs; H1 and
H2: our proposed method with triggered and non-triggered HSPSs. (b). Optimal values of µ′ for
each curves listed in (a). The WCSs and the HSPSs used here are all in Poisson distribution. We
have chosen the heralding detection efficiency to be 0.9 for curve H01 and H1, and 0.75 for curve
H02 and H2.
H02), the fraction of two-single-photon counts and the QBER of two-single-photon pulses
are known exactly; For the normal three decoy-state case (W1), we use the parameters
shown in Table I and assume a reasonable value for µ (0.1); While for our new scheme (H1
and H2), we use the same parameters as in Table I except that ηA = ηB = 0.9 (or 0.75), and
borrowing the relationship of µ and µ′ from Eq. (9). Fig. 2(b) shows corresponding optimal
values of µ′ for each curve in Fig. 2(a). Besides, The WCSs and HSPSs used here are all in
poisson distributions.
Fig. 3(a) and (b) are the comparison of our new MDI-QKD scheme with normal three
decoy-state method [15] using HSPSs. Fig. 3(a) shows the the final key generation rate vs
transmission distance, and Fig. 3(b) corresponds to the optimal values of µ′. The curve
H0 and H1 each corresponds to the asymptotic case with infinite decoy states and our new
10
-15
-10
-5
100 150 200 250 300
0.0
0.3
0.6
 H0
 H1
 H2
 
 
Lo
g 1
0R
O
pt
im
al
 
'
Transmit distance (km)
 
 
FIG. 3: (Color online) (a). Comparison of the final key generation rates with HSPSs using different
methods. H0: infinite intensities. H1: a few intensities of this work. H2: key rates of a few
intensities using triggered events in sources of intensity µ and µ′ to calculate Y11 [15]. The HSPSs
used here are all in poisson distributions. (b). Corresponding optimal values of µ′ for all the lines
in (a). We have chosen all heralding detection efficiencies to be 0.75.
scheme, respectively. H2 represents the result of using normal three decoy-state method.
Here the HSPSs used are all in poisson distributions.
Fig. 4(a) and (b) describe the different behavior of our new MDI-QKD scheme when
using HSPSs in different distributions. The curve H0 and H1 each represents the result of
using infinite decoy-state method and our new scheme, respectively, and both using HSPSs
in poisson distributions. While the lines T0 and T1 correspond to the results of with thermal
distributions.
From the comparison above we find that:
(i). Our new scheme of using triggered and non-triggered signals can work excellently
close to the asymptotic case with infinite decoy-state method as in Fig 2(a) and (b). This
is due to the precise estimation of the tight bounds of Y11 and e11 by using both triggered
and non-triggered signals.
(ii). Our new MDI-QKD scheme with HSPSs can transmit a much longer distance com-
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FIG. 4: (Color online) (a). Comparison of the final key generation rates of MDI-QKD with HSPSs
in different photon-number distributions. H0: infinite intensities, Poisson distribution. H1: a few
intensities of this work, Poisson distribution; T0: infinite intensities, thermal distribution, T1: a
few intensities of this work, thermal distribution. We have chosen all heralding detection efficiencies
to be 0.75.
pared with the one with WCSs (> 70km here) as shown in Fig. 2(a), which benefits from
the substantial low vacuum components in the heralded signals.
(iii). In our new scheme, the HSPSs in poisson distributions show similar key generation
rates as WCSs at short distances, and much higher key rates at long distances as shown in
Fig. 2(a). This is attributed to a much higher optimal value of µ′ being used as shown in
Fig. 2(b).
(iv) According to our calculation here, the protocol using Eq.(8) can have a higher key
rate than the one using only triggered events, as shown in Fig. 3(a), because of a much
higher optimal value of µ′ being used as shown in Fig. 3(b).
(v) Similar to Ref. [17, 27], the HSPS source in poisson distribution has better perfor-
mance than the one in thermal distribution as shown in Fig. 4(a) and (b). This is because
the poisson distribution has a higher single-photon probability.
In all our calculations, we did not normalize the triggered or non-triggered states, e.g.,
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Eq.(1,2). Hence the gains and the key rates calculated here are in the unit of the rate
averaged over all pumped events of certain intensity in a certain basis. For example, in H/V
basis, there are N ′z times that both Alice and Bob used stronger pump lights. Among these
events, they obtain N ′tn events of triggering at both sides and n
′
tz times of successful events.
Then the the gain in our definition is n′tz/N
′
z. If we want the key rate averaged over number
of triggered states, our results in each figures becomes several times larger, since it should
be multiplied by a factor 1/F and F is the normalization factor.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In summary, we have studied the decoy-state MDI-QKD with heralded single photon
source. We show that this proposed implementation offers a longer transmission distance
compared with existing realization methods. Therefore, it looks promising for practical
applications in the future.
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Abstract
We study the decoy-state measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution using her-
alded single-photon sources. This has the advantage that the observed error rate in X basis is in
higher order and not so large. We calculate the key rate and transmission distance for two cases:
one using only triggered events, and the other using both triggered and non-triggered events. We
compare the key rates of various protocols and find that our new scheme using triggered and non-
triggered events can give higher key rate and longer secure distance. Moreover, we also show the
different behavior of our scheme when using different heralded single-photon sources, i.e., in poisson
or thermal distribution. We demonstrate that the former can generate a relatively higher secure
key rate than the latter, and can thus work more efficiently in practical quantum key distributions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As is well known that the quantum key distribution (QKD) is standing out compared
with conventional cryptography due to its unconditional security based on the law of physics.
It allows two legitimate users, say Alice and Bob, to share secret keys even under the
present of a malicious eavesdropper, Eve. But its security proofs often contain certain
assumptions either on the sources or on the detection systems, and usually practical setups
have imperfections. Therefore, the ”in-principle” unconditional security can actually conflict
with realistic implementations, and which might be exploited by Eve to hack the system
[1–4].
In order to achieve the final goal of unconditional security in practice, different approaches
have been proposed, such as the decoy-state method [5–9], the device-independent quantum
key distribution (DI-QKD) [10, 11] and recently the measurement-device-independent quan-
tum key distribution (MDI-QKD) [12, 13]. Among them, the decoy-state MDI-QKD seems
to be a promising candidate considering its relatively lower technical demanding.
The decoy-state MDI-QKD was studied extensively with infinite different intensities[12]
and a few intensities[15]. However, the efficient decoy-state MDI-QKD with heralded source
is not shown. We know that weak coherent states (WCSs) at least have two drawbacks: one
is the large vacuum component, and the other is the significant multi-photon probabilities.
The former leads to a rather limited transmission distance, since the dark count contributes
lots of bit-flip errors for long distance. The latter one results in a quite low key generation
rate. In the existing MDI-QKD [12, 13] setup, all detections are done in Z basis. There
are events of two incident photons presenting on the same side of the beam-splitter and no
incident photon on another side. Such a case can cause a quite high observed error rate
in X basis. Though in principle one can deduce the phase-flip error rate by comparison
of the observed error rate in X basis for different groups of pulses as shown in [15], the
high error rate in X basis can still decrease the key rate drastically in real implementations
when we take statistical fluctuations into account. Fortunately, besides the WCSs, there is
another practically easy implementable source, the heralded single-photon source (HSPS).
The source can eliminate those drawbacks, and give much better performance than WCSs in
the QKD [16, 17], since the dark count can be eliminated to a negligible level for a triggered
source. Moreover, the cause of a high error rate in X basis does not exist for a HSPS due
2
to a high order small probability for events of two photons present on the same side of the
beam-splitter.
We also note that it is impossible to use infinite number of decoy states in a realistic
MDI-QKD, therefore, people often use one or two decoy states to estimate the behavior of
the vacuum, the single-photon and the multi-photon states [8, 16].
Here in this work, we study MDI-QKD with heralded single-photon sources. We use both
the triggered and non-triggered events of HSPSs to precisely estimate the lower bound of
the two-single-photon contribution (Y11) and the upper bound of the quantum bit-error rate
(QBER) of two-single-photon pulses (e11). As a result, we get an much longer transmission
distance and a much higher key generation rate compared with existing decoy-state MDI-
QKD methods [15], and come close to the result of infinite different intensities. After
presenting the schematic set-up of the method, we shall present formulas such as Y11 and
e11 for calculating the key rate in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we proceed numerical simulations
with practical parameters and compare with existing schemes. Finally, we give conclusions
in Sec IV.
II. IMPROVED METHOD OF DECOY-STATE MDI-QKD WITH HERALDED
SOURCE
A. The method and formulas
We know that the state of a two-mode field from the parametric-down conversion (PDC)
source is [18, 19]:
|Ψ〉TS =
∞∑
n=0
√
Pn |n〉T |n〉S
Pn(x) =
xn
(1 + x)n+1
, (∆tc ≫ ∆t)
or
Pn(x) = e
−xx
n
n!
, (∆tc ≪ ∆t)
where |n〉 represents an n-photon state, and x is the intensity (average photon number)
of one mode. Mode T (trigger) is detected by Alice or Bob, and mode S (signal) is sent
out to the untrusted third party (UTP). ∆tc is the coherence time of the emission, and
3
FIG. 1: (Color online) (a). A schematic setup of the method. Alice and Bob randomly prepare
HSPSs from PDC processes in a BB84 polarization state with a polarization rotator (PR). Decoy
states are generated by changing the power of each pump laser with a modulator (MD). Signal
pulses from Alice and Bob interfere at a 50/50 beam-splitter (BS) and then each enter a polar-
izing beam splitter (PBS) projecting the input photons into either horizontal (H) or vertical (V)
polarization states. Four single-photon detectors are employed at the third party, Charlie’s side to
detect the results. Moreover, both the triggered and non-triggered events at Alice and Bob’s side
are sent to Charlie, and corresponding counting rates are recorded individually.
∆t is the duration of the pump pulse. As demonstrated in [20, 21], we can either get a
thermal distribution or a poisson distribution by adjusting the experimental conditions, e.g.
changing the duration of the pump pulses. Below, we will at first use HSPSs with poisson
distributions as an example to describe our new MDI-QKD scheme, and then compare it
with the case of with thermal distributions.
We denote qυn as the probability of triggering at Alice or Bob’s detector when n-photon
state is emitted,
qv0 = dυ
and
qυn = 1− (1− dv)(1− ηυ)
n,
for i > 1. Here υ can be A (Alice) or B (Bob), ηυ and dυ are the detection efficiency
and the dark count rate at Alice (Bob)’s side, respectively. For simplicity, we may omit
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the superscript or subscript v latter if there is no confusion. Then the corresponding non-
triggering probability is (1− qn).
We request Alice (or Bob) to randomly change the intensity of her (or his) pump light
among three values, so that the intensity of one mode is randomly changed among 0, µA
(or µB), and µ
′
A (or µ
′
B) (and µA < µ
′
A, µB < µ
′
B). We define the subclass of source
pulses that Alice uses intensity x, Bob uses intensity y as source {x, y}, x ∈ {0, µA, µ
′
A} and
y ∈ {0, µB, µ
′
B}. After triggering detection, there are 4 classes of states at each side from the
two-mode fields of two different intensities, as there are triggered and non-triggered states
from each intensity. In principle, here we have many choices in implementing the decoy-state
MDI-QKD. For example, using all events in both intensities; using only triggered events of
them; or using triggered events in one intensity and non-triggered events in another. Here
we shall study the following two cases: 1) using only triggered events in both intensities; 2)
using non-triggered events from the stronger field and triggered events from the weaker field
for the estimation of Y11, and then using the triggered events from the stronger pulses for the
final key distillation. We declare that: Firstly, both cases can lead to a longer transmission
distance than that of using WCSs; Secondly, both the key rate and the secure transmission
distance in the second case are better than that in the first case.
As shown in [12], we use the rectilinear basis (Z) as the key generation basis, and the
diagonal basis (X) for error testing only. We denote Y W,tmn , S
W,t
mn , and e
W,t
mn to be the yield, the
gain and the QBRE of the triggered signals respectively, where n, m represent the number
of photons sent by Alice and Bob, and W represent the Z or X basis. Similarly, we also
define Y W,ntmn , S
W,nt
mn , and e
W,nt
mn as corresponding values for the non-triggered events. Note
that the gain SW,tx,y is defined as n
W,t
x,y /N
W
x,y, if n
W,t
x,y and N
W
x,y are the number of detected events
after triggering at both side and the number of total events (no matter triggered or not)
among the subclass of source pulses that Alice uses intensity x, Bob uses intensity y and
both of them are prepared in basis W . Similar definition is also used for SW,ntx,y , the gain of
non-triggered sources in basis W . All gains can be directly experimentally observed, and
thus are regarded as known values. The yield {Y W,tmn } is defined as the the rate of producing
a successful event for two-pulse state |m〉⊗ |n〉 prepared in W basis after triggering. Similar
definition is also used for non-triggered pulses. Asymptotically, we have Y W,tmn = Y
W,nt
mn .
Therefore we shall only use Y Wmn for both of them. Note the the yield of Y
W
mn is not directly
observed in the experiment and our first major task is to deduce the lower bound of Y W11
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based on the known values, {SW,txy }, {S
W,nt
xy }. Here we assume to implement the decoy-state
method in different bases separately, therefore we shall omit the superscript W here after
provided that this does not make any confusion.
The un-normalized density matrix for a triggered event from intensity two-mode field of
intensity r is
ρtr =
(
∞∑
0
qnPn(r) |n〉 〈n|
)
. (1)
Also, we have the following density matrix for a non-triggered event at Alice’s side
ρntr =
(
∞∑
0
(1− qn)Pn(r) |n〉 〈n|
)
. (2)
Using conclusions in Ref. [15], we can obtain the yield of single-photon pairs once we know
the source state. For triggered events, we have
Stx,y = S˜
t
00 + ηAηBxe
−xye−yY11 + ηAxe
−x
∞∑
n=2
[1− (1− ηB)
n]e−y
yn
n!
Y1n + ηBye
−y
∞∑
m=2
[1− (1− ηA)
m]
e−x
xm
m!
Ym1 +
∞∑
m=2,n=2
e−x
xm
m!
e−y
yn
n!
[1− (1− ηA)
m][1− (1− ηB)
n]Ymn.
(3)
Here S˜t00 = LA + LB − L0, and LA = dBe
−y
∞∑
m=0
[1− (1− dA)(1− ηA)
m]e−x x
m
m!
Ym0, LB =
dAe
−x
∞∑
n=0
[1− (1− dB)(1− ηB)
n]e−y y
n
n!
Y0n, L0 = dAdBe
−xe−yY00. According to the defini-
tion of the gains above, one easily finds that fact: LA = S
t
x0,LB = S
t
0y,L0 = S
t
00. All these
gains are known values. Therefore, S˜t00 = S
t
x0 + S
t
0y − S
t
00 is also a known value. Similarly,
we also have the following equation for the non-triggered events:
Sntx,y = S˜
nt
00 + (1− ηA)(1− ηB)xe
−xye−yY11 + (1− ηA)xe
−x
∞∑
n=2
(1− ηB)
ne−y
yn
n!
Y1n + (1− ηB)ye
−y
∞∑
m=2
(1− ηA)
me−x
xm
m!
Ym1 +
∞∑
m=2,n=2
e−x
xm
m!
e−y
yn
n!
(1− ηA)
m(1− ηB)
nYmn.
(4)
where S˜nt00 = S
nt
x0+ S
nt
0y −S
nt
00. And also S
nt
x0 = (1− dB)e
−y
∞∑
m=0
[(1− dA)(1− ηA)
m]e−x x
m
m!
Ym0,
Snt0y = (1 − dA)e
−x
∞∑
n=0
[(1− dB)(1− ηB)
n]e−y y
n
n!
Y0n, S
nt
00 = (1 − dA)(1 − dB)e
−xe−yY00. And
they are regarded as known values. Now let’s use Stµ,µ and S
nt
µ′,µ′ to estimate a tight bound
of Y11. Denoting k =
(1−ηA)(1−ηB)
2
ηA[1−(1−ηB)2]
(µ
′
µ
)3e2µ−2µ
′
, and combining Eq. (4) and (3), we obtain
Y11 =
k(Stµ,µ − S˜
t
00)− (S
nt
µ′,µ′ − S˜
nt
00) +K
[kηAηBµ2e−2µ − (1− ηA)(1− ηB)µ′2e−2µ
′ ]
(5)
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and
K =
∞∑
n=2
{(1− ηA)µ
′e−2µ
′
(1− ηB)
nµ
′n
n!
− kηAµe
−2µ[1− (1− ηB)
n]
µn
n!
}Y1n+
∞∑
m=2
{(1− ηB)µ
′e−2µ
′
(1− ηA)
mµ
′m
m!
− kηBµe
−2µ[1− (1− ηA)
m]
µm
m!
}Ym1+
∞∑
m=2,n=2
{(1− ηA)
m(1− ηB)
ne−2µ
′ µ′m
m!
µ′n
n!
− k[1− (1− ηA)
m][1− (1− ηB)
n]e−2µ
µm
m!
µn
n!
}Ymn.
(6)
To lower bound Y11 here, we can choose to set the following simultaneous conditions:
[kηAηBµ
2e−2µ − (1− ηA)(1− ηB)µ
′2e−2µ
′
] ≤ 0; K ≤ 0 (7)
When both conditions above are met, we have the following inequality for the lower band
of Y11:
Y11 > Y11
L ≡
k(Stµ,µ − S˜
t
00)− (S
nt
µ′,µ′ − S˜
nt
00)
[kηAηBµ2e−2µ − (1− ηA)(1− ηB)µ′2e−2µ
′ ]
. (8)
(since the value of µ and µ′ can be chosen separately, the above conditions can be easily
satisfied in practice,) In particular, in the symmetric case that ηA = ηB = η, the conditions
on Eq. (7) reduce to
µ ≥ (1− η)µ′. (9)
For simplicity, we shall use such a condition for all calculations. Actually, directly applying
Eq. (16) and Eq. (2) of Ref. [15] together with Eq. (1,2) here can also lead to Eq. (8,9).
Then the gain of the two-single-photon pulses for the triggered and non-triggered signals
(µ′) are:
St11 = η
2µ′2e−2µ
′
Y11, (10)
Snt11 = (1− η)
2µ′2e−2µ
′
Y11. (11)
As mentioned above, we use two bases in this protocol, i.e., the Z basis and the X basis.
We use the former to generate real keys, and the latter only for error test. After error test,
we get the bit-flip error rates for the triggered and non-triggered pulses as Etµ,µ and E
nt
µ′,µ′.
In order to calculate the final key rate, we also need to know the phase-flip error rate of
two-single-photon pulses in the Z basis, i.e. eph,t11 (or e
ph,nt
11 ) which is equal to the bit-flip rate
in the X basis, eX,t11 (or e
X,nt
11 ), whose values can be represented as:
eX,t11 6
EX,tµ,µS
X,t
µ,µ − E
X,t
µ,0S
X,t
µ,0 −E
X,t
0,µS
X,t
0,µ + E
X,t
0,0 S
X,t
0,0
Sω,t11
≡ eXa , (12)
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or
eX,nt11 6
EX,ntµ′,µ′S
X,nt
µ′,µ′ − E
X,nt
µ′,0 S
X,nt
µ′,0 − E
X,nt
0,µ′ S
X,nt
0,µ′ + E
X,nt
0,0 S
X,nt
0,0
Sω,nt11
≡ eXb . (13)
Combing the two bounds, we have [23]:
eX11 6 e
X,U
11 = min{e
X
a , e
X
b }. (14)
Now we can calculate the final key generation rate for the triggered signal pulses (µ′) as:
Rt > {q2P 21 (µ
′)Y Z,t11 [1−H2(e
X
11)]− S
Z,t
µ′,µ′f(E
Z,t
µ′,µ′)H2(E
Z,t
µ′,µ′)}, (15)
where f(Eµ′) is a factor for the cost of error correction given existing error correction systems
in practice, and we assume f = 1.16 here [12]. H2 (x) is the binary Shannon information
function, given by
H2 (x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
We have not considered the effects of bases mismatch in BB84 protocol. Actually, one can
choose basis in a biased way [26] and the effect can vanish asymptotically. In fact, the non-
triggered events and the triggered events from weaker fields can also be used to distill secret
keys as shown in [22]. However, for simplicity, in the following simulations we consider only
the triggered components from the stronger field.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
With formulas above, we can now numerically calculate the key rate and compare the
secret key generation rate of our new MDI-QKD scheme with existing methods [12, 15].
Moreover, we will show the different results of our proposed scheme using different HSPSs,
i.e., in poisson or thermal distributions. Below for simplicity, we assume that the UTP
locates in the middle of Alice and Bob, and the UTP’s detectors are identical, i.e., they have
the same dark count rate and detection efficiency, and their detection efficiency does not
depend on the incoming signals.
We shall estimate what values would probably be observed for the gains and error rates
in the normal cases by the linear model [12, 24] where state |n〉〈n| from Alice changes to
n∑
k=0
Cknη
k(1− η)n−k|k〉〈k|, (16)
8
TABLE I: Parameters used in numerical simulations: α is the channel loss, ed is the misalignment
probability, dc and ηc are the dark count rate and the detection efficiency per detector at the UTP’s
side, respectively.
where η is the transmittance from Alice to the UTP. Using this model, we can set values
(probably would-be observed values in experiments) for Stxy, S
nt
xy, E
t
xy and E
nt
xy according
to transmission distance. After setting these values, we can find the distance dependent
key rate by Eq. (15). For this purpose, we have developed a general model to simulate
the probably observed gains and error rates and hence the final key rate under linearly loss
channel, given whatever source state[24].
For a fair comparison, we use the same parameters as in [12, 25], see Table I, except that
Alice (Bob) uses an extra detector for heralding signals with a detection efficiency of ηA (ηB)
and dark count rate of dA (dB).
In practical implementations, people often use a non-degenerate PDC process and obtain
a visible and a telecommunication wavelength in mode T and S, respectively. To simplify the
simulations, we assume both Alice and Bob have the same silicon avalanche photodiodes. We
do calculation for the conditions of detection ηA = ηB = 0.75 (or 0.9), and dA = dB = 10
−6.
At each distance, in order to maximize the key generation rate, we set µ = (1 − η)µ′ and
use the optimal µ′ for the case of using both triggered and non-triggered events, for other
cases we set µ = 0.1 and use the optimal value of µ′. Our simulation results are shown in
Figs. 2 - 4.
Fig. 2(a) displays the comparison of the final key generation rate between different
schemes. The curve W0 is the case of using infinite decoy states with WCS [12], W1 repre-
sents Wang’s three decoy-state method with WCSs [15], H01 (or H02) shows the asymptotic
case with HSPSs, and H1 (or H2) represents the result of our new scheme with triggered
and non-triggered HSPSs. In the simulations above, we use the optimal values of µ′ at each
distance for all the curves. Just the difference is: For the asymptotic cases (W0, H01 and
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FIG. 2: (Color online) (a). Comparison of the final key generation rates vs distance between our
proposed scheme and the ones in Ref. [12] and Ref. [15]. W0: infinite intensities with WCS [12];
W1: three-intensity method with WCSs; H01 and H02: infinite intensities with HSPSs; H1 and
H2: our proposed method with triggered and non-triggered HSPSs. (b). Optimal values of µ′ for
each curves listed in (a). The WCSs and the HSPSs used here are all in Poisson distribution. We
have chosen the heralding detection efficiency to be 0.9 for curve H01 and H1, and 0.75 for curve
H02 and H2.
H02), the fraction of two-single-photon counts and the QBER of two-single-photon pulses
are known exactly; For the normal three decoy-state case (W1), we use the parameters
shown in Table I and assume a reasonable value for µ (0.1); While for our new scheme (H1
and H2), we use the same parameters as in Table I except that ηA = ηB = 0.9 (or 0.75), and
borrowing the relationship of µ and µ′ from Eq. (9). Fig. 2(b) shows corresponding optimal
values of µ′ for each curve in Fig. 2(a). Besides, The WCSs and HSPSs used here are all in
poisson distributions.
Fig. 3(a) and (b) are the comparison of our new MDI-QKD scheme with normal three
decoy-state method [15] using HSPSs. Fig. 3(a) shows the the final key generation rate vs
transmission distance, and Fig. 3(b) corresponds to the optimal values of µ′. The curve
H0 and H1 each corresponds to the asymptotic case with infinite decoy states and our new
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FIG. 3: (Color online) (a). Comparison of the final key generation rates with HSPSs using different
methods. H0: infinite intensities. H1: a few intensities of this work. H2: key rates of a few
intensities using triggered events in sources of intensity µ and µ′ to calculate Y11 [15]. The HSPSs
used here are all in poisson distributions. (b). Corresponding optimal values of µ′ for all the lines
in (a). We have chosen all heralding detection efficiencies to be 0.75.
scheme, respectively. H2 represents the result of using normal three decoy-state method.
Here the HSPSs used are all in poisson distributions.
Fig. 4(a) and (b) describe the different behavior of our new MDI-QKD scheme when
using HSPSs in different distributions. The curve H0 and H1 each represents the result of
using infinite decoy-state method and our new scheme, respectively, and both using HSPSs
in poisson distributions. While the lines T0 and T1 correspond to the results of with thermal
distributions.
From the comparison above we find that:
(i). Our new scheme of using triggered and non-triggered signals can work excellently
close to the asymptotic case with infinite decoy-state method as in Fig 2(a) and (b). This
is due to the precise estimation of the tight bounds of Y11 and e11 by using both triggered
and non-triggered signals.
(ii). Our new MDI-QKD scheme with HSPSs can transmit a much longer distance com-
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FIG. 4: (Color online) (a). Comparison of the final key generation rates of MDI-QKD with HSPSs
in different photon-number distributions. H0: infinite intensities, Poisson distribution. H1: a few
intensities of this work, Poisson distribution; T0: infinite intensities, thermal distribution, T1: a
few intensities of this work, thermal distribution. We have chosen all heralding detection efficiencies
to be 0.75.
pared with the one with WCSs (> 70km here) as shown in Fig. 2(a), which benefits from
the substantial low vacuum components in the heralded signals.
(iii). In our new scheme, the HSPSs in poisson distributions show similar key generation
rates as WCSs at short distances, and much higher key rates at long distances as shown in
Fig. 2(a). This is attributed to a much higher optimal value of µ′ being used as shown in
Fig. 2(b).
(iv) According to our calculation here, the protocol using Eq.(8) can have a higher key
rate than the one using only triggered events, as shown in Fig. 3(a), because of a much
higher optimal value of µ′ being used as shown in Fig. 3(b).
(v) Similar to Ref. [17, 27], the HSPS source in poisson distribution has better perfor-
mance than the one in thermal distribution as shown in Fig. 4(a) and (b). This is because
the poisson distribution has a higher single-photon probability.
In all our calculations, we did not normalize the triggered or non-triggered states, e.g.,
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Eq.(1,2). Hence the gains and the key rates calculated here are in the unit of the rate
averaged over all pumped events of certain intensity in a certain basis. For example, in H/V
basis, there are N ′z times that both Alice and Bob used stronger pump lights. Among these
events, they obtain N ′tn events of triggering at both sides and n
′
tz times of successful events.
Then the the gain in our definition is n′tz/N
′
z. If we want the key rate averaged over number
of triggered states, our results in each figures becomes several times larger, since it should
be multiplied by a factor 1/F and F is the normalization factor.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In summary, we have studied the decoy-state MDI-QKD with heralded single photon
source. We show that this proposed implementation offers a longer transmission distance
compared with existing realization methods. Therefore, it looks promising for practical
applications in the future.
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Abstract
We study the decoy-state measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution using her-
alded single-photon sources. This has the advantage that the observed error rate in X basis is in
higher order and not so large. We calculate the key rate and transmission distance for two cases:
one using only triggered events, and the other using both triggered and non-triggered events. We
compare the key rates of various protocols and find that our new scheme using triggered and non-
triggered events can give higher key rate and longer secure distance. Moreover, we also show the
different behavior of our scheme when using different heralded single-photon sources, i.e., in poisson
or thermal distribution. We demonstrate that the former can generate a relatively higher secure
key rate than the latter, and can thus work more efficiently in practical quantum key distributions.
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1
I. INTRODUCTION
As is well known that the quantum key distribution (QKD) is standing out compared
with conventional cryptography due to its unconditional security based on the law of physics.
It allows two legitimate users, say Alice and Bob, to share secret keys even under the
present of a malicious eavesdropper, Eve. But its security proofs often contain certain
assumptions either on the sources or on the detection systems, and usually practical setups
have imperfections. Therefore, the ”in-principle” unconditional security can actually conflict
with realistic implementations, and which might be exploited by Eve to hack the system
[1–4].
In order to achieve the final goal of unconditional security in practice, different approaches
have been proposed, such as the decoy-state method [5–9], the device-independent quantum
key distribution (DI-QKD) [10, 11] and recently the measurement-device-independent quan-
tum key distribution (MDI-QKD) [12, 13]. Among them, the decoy-state MDI-QKD seems
to be a promising candidate considering its relatively lower technical demanding.
The decoy-state MDI-QKD was studied extensively with infinite different intensities[12]
and a few intensities[15]. However, the efficient decoy-state MDI-QKD with heralded source
is not shown. We know that weak coherent states (WCSs) at least have two drawbacks: one
is the large vacuum component, and the other is the significant multi-photon probabilities.
The former leads to a rather limited transmission distance, since the dark count contributes
lots of bit-flip errors for long distance. The latter one results in a quite low key generation
rate. In the existing MDI-QKD [12, 13] setup, all detections are done in Z basis. There
are events of two incident photons presenting on the same side of the beam-splitter and no
incident photon on another side. Such a case can cause a quite high observed error rate
in X basis. Though in principle one can deduce the phase-flip error rate by comparison
of the observed error rate in X basis for different groups of pulses as shown in [15], the
high error rate in X basis can still decrease the key rate drastically in real implementations
when we take statistical fluctuations into account. Fortunately, besides the WCSs, there is
another practically easy implementable source, the heralded single-photon source (HSPS).
The source can eliminate those drawbacks, and give much better performance than WCSs in
the QKD [16, 17], since the dark count can be eliminated to a negligible level for a triggered
source. Moreover, the cause of a high error rate in X basis does not exist for a HSPS due
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to a high order small probability for events of two photons present on the same side of the
beam-splitter.
We also note that it is impossible to use infinite number of decoy states in a realistic
MDI-QKD, therefore, people often use one or two decoy states to estimate the behavior of
the vacuum, the single-photon and the multi-photon states [8, 16].
Here in this work, we study MDI-QKD with heralded single-photon sources. We use both
the triggered and non-triggered events of HSPSs to precisely estimate the lower bound of
the two-single-photon contribution (Y11) and the upper bound of the quantum bit-error rate
(QBER) of two-single-photon pulses (e11). As a result, we get an much longer transmission
distance and a much higher key generation rate compared with existing decoy-state MDI-
QKD methods [15], and come close to the result of infinite different intensities. After
presenting the schematic set-up of the method, we shall present formulas such as Y11 and
e11 for calculating the key rate in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we proceed numerical simulations
with practical parameters and compare with existing schemes. Finally, we give conclusions
in Sec IV.
II. IMPROVED METHOD OF DECOY-STATE MDI-QKD WITH HERALDED
SOURCE
A. The method and formulas
We know that the state of a two-mode field from the parametric-down conversion (PDC)
source is [18, 19]:
|Ψ〉TS =
∞∑
n=0
√
Pn |n〉T |n〉S
Pn(x) =
xn
(1 + x)n+1
, (∆tc ≫ ∆t)
or
Pn(x) = e
−xx
n
n!
, (∆tc ≪ ∆t)
where |n〉 represents an n-photon state, and x is the intensity (average photon number)
of one mode. Mode T (trigger) is detected by Alice or Bob, and mode S (signal) is sent
out to the untrusted third party (UTP). ∆tc is the coherence time of the emission, and
3
FIG. 1: (Color online) (a). A schematic setup of the method. Alice and Bob randomly prepare
HSPSs from PDC processes in a BB84 polarization state with a polarization rotator (PR). Decoy
states are generated by changing the power of each pump laser with a modulator (MD). Signal
pulses from Alice and Bob interfere at a 50/50 beam-splitter (BS) and then each enter a polar-
izing beam splitter (PBS) projecting the input photons into either horizontal (H) or vertical (V)
polarization states. Four single-photon detectors are employed at the third party, Charlie’s side to
detect the results. Moreover, both the triggered and non-triggered events at Alice and Bob’s side
are sent to Charlie, and corresponding counting rates are recorded individually.
∆t is the duration of the pump pulse. As demonstrated in [20, 21], we can either get a
thermal distribution or a poisson distribution by adjusting the experimental conditions, e.g.
changing the duration of the pump pulses. Below, we will at first use HSPSs with poisson
distributions as an example to describe our new MDI-QKD scheme, and then compare it
with the case of with thermal distributions.
We denote qυn as the probability of triggering at Alice or Bob’s detector when n-photon
state is emitted,
qv0 = dυ
and
qυn = 1− (1− dv)(1− ηυ)
n,
for i > 1. Here υ can be A (Alice) or B (Bob), ηυ and dυ are the detection efficiency
and the dark count rate at Alice (Bob)’s side, respectively. For simplicity, we may omit
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the superscript or subscript v latter if there is no confusion. Then the corresponding non-
triggering probability is (1− qn).
We request Alice (or Bob) to randomly change the intensity of her (or his) pump light
among three values, so that the intensity of one mode is randomly changed among 0, µA
(or µB), and µ
′
A (or µ
′
B) (and µA < µ
′
A, µB < µ
′
B). We define the subclass of source
pulses that Alice uses intensity x, Bob uses intensity y as source {x, y}, x ∈ {0, µA, µ
′
A} and
y ∈ {0, µB, µ
′
B}. After triggering detection, there are 4 classes of states at each side from the
two-mode fields of two different intensities, as there are triggered and non-triggered states
from each intensity. In principle, here we have many choices in implementing the decoy-state
MDI-QKD. For example, using all events in both intensities; using only triggered events of
them; or using triggered events in one intensity and non-triggered events in another. Here
we shall study the following two cases: 1) using only triggered events in both intensities; 2)
using non-triggered events from the stronger field and triggered events from the weaker field
for the estimation of Y11, and then using the triggered events from the stronger pulses for the
final key distillation. We declare that: Firstly, both cases can lead to a longer transmission
distance than that of using WCSs; Secondly, both the key rate and the secure transmission
distance in the second case are better than that in the first case.
As shown in [12], we use the rectilinear basis (Z) as the key generation basis, and the
diagonal basis (X) for error testing only. We denote Y W,tmn , S
W,t
mn , and e
W,t
mn to be the yield, the
gain and the QBRE of the triggered signals respectively, where n, m represent the number
of photons sent by Alice and Bob, and W represent the Z or X basis. Similarly, we also
define Y W,ntmn , S
W,nt
mn , and e
W,nt
mn as corresponding values for the non-triggered events. Note
that the gain SW,tx,y is defined as n
W,t
x,y /N
W
x,y, if n
W,t
x,y and N
W
x,y are the number of detected events
after triggering at both side and the number of total events (no matter triggered or not)
among the subclass of source pulses that Alice uses intensity x, Bob uses intensity y and
both of them are prepared in basis W . Similar definition is also used for SW,ntx,y , the gain of
non-triggered sources in basis W . All gains can be directly experimentally observed, and
thus are regarded as known values. The yield {Y W,tmn } is defined as the the rate of producing
a successful event for two-pulse state |m〉⊗ |n〉 prepared in W basis after triggering. Similar
definition is also used for non-triggered pulses. Asymptotically, we have Y W,tmn = Y
W,nt
mn .
Therefore we shall only use Y Wmn for both of them. Note the the yield of Y
W
mn is not directly
observed in the experiment and our first major task is to deduce the lower bound of Y W11
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based on the known values, {SW,txy }, {S
W,nt
xy }. Here we assume to implement the decoy-state
method in different bases separately, therefore we shall omit the superscript W here after
provided that this does not make any confusion.
The un-normalized density matrix for a triggered event from intensity two-mode field of
intensity r is
ρtr =
(
∞∑
0
qnPn(r) |n〉 〈n|
)
. (1)
Also, we have the following density matrix for a non-triggered event at Alice’s side
ρntr =
(
∞∑
0
(1− qn)Pn(r) |n〉 〈n|
)
. (2)
Using conclusions in Ref. [15], we can obtain the yield of single-photon pairs once we know
the source state. For triggered events, we have
Stx,y = S˜
t
00 + ηAηBxe
−xye−yY11 + ηAxe
−x
∞∑
n=2
[1− (1− ηB)
n]e−y
yn
n!
Y1n + ηBye
−y
∞∑
m=2
[1− (1− ηA)
m]
e−x
xm
m!
Ym1 +
∞∑
m=2,n=2
e−x
xm
m!
e−y
yn
n!
[1− (1− ηA)
m][1− (1− ηB)
n]Ymn.
(3)
Here S˜t00 = LA + LB − L0, and LA = dBe
−y
∞∑
m=0
[1− (1− dA)(1− ηA)
m]e−x x
m
m!
Ym0, LB =
dAe
−x
∞∑
n=0
[1− (1− dB)(1− ηB)
n]e−y y
n
n!
Y0n, L0 = dAdBe
−xe−yY00. According to the defini-
tion of the gains above, one easily finds that fact: LA = S
t
x0,LB = S
t
0y,L0 = S
t
00. All these
gains are known values. Therefore, S˜t00 = S
t
x0 + S
t
0y − S
t
00 is also a known value. Similarly,
we also have the following equation for the non-triggered events:
Sntx,y = S˜
nt
00 + (1− ηA)(1− ηB)xe
−xye−yY11 + (1− ηA)xe
−x
∞∑
n=2
(1− ηB)
ne−y
yn
n!
Y1n + (1− ηB)ye
−y
∞∑
m=2
(1− ηA)
me−x
xm
m!
Ym1 +
∞∑
m=2,n=2
e−x
xm
m!
e−y
yn
n!
(1− ηA)
m(1− ηB)
nYmn.
(4)
where S˜nt00 = S
nt
x0+ S
nt
0y −S
nt
00. And also S
nt
x0 = (1− dB)e
−y
∞∑
m=0
[(1− dA)(1− ηA)
m]e−x x
m
m!
Ym0,
Snt0y = (1 − dA)e
−x
∞∑
n=0
[(1− dB)(1− ηB)
n]e−y y
n
n!
Y0n, S
nt
00 = (1 − dA)(1 − dB)e
−xe−yY00. And
they are regarded as known values. Now let’s use Stµ,µ and S
nt
µ′,µ′ to estimate a tight bound
of Y11. Denoting k =
(1−ηA)(1−ηB)
2
ηA[1−(1−ηB)2]
(µ
′
µ
)3e2µ−2µ
′
, and combining Eq. (4) and (3), we obtain
Y11 =
k(Stµ,µ − S˜
t
00)− (S
nt
µ′,µ′ − S˜
nt
00) +K
[kηAηBµ2e−2µ − (1− ηA)(1− ηB)µ′2e−2µ
′ ]
(5)
6
and
K =
∞∑
n=2
{(1− ηA)µ
′e−2µ
′
(1− ηB)
nµ
′n
n!
− kηAµe
−2µ[1− (1− ηB)
n]
µn
n!
}Y1n+
∞∑
m=2
{(1− ηB)µ
′e−2µ
′
(1− ηA)
mµ
′m
m!
− kηBµe
−2µ[1− (1− ηA)
m]
µm
m!
}Ym1+
∞∑
m=2,n=2
{(1− ηA)
m(1− ηB)
ne−2µ
′ µ′m
m!
µ′n
n!
− k[1− (1− ηA)
m][1− (1− ηB)
n]e−2µ
µm
m!
µn
n!
}Ymn.
(6)
To lower bound Y11 here, we can choose to set the following simultaneous conditions:
[kηAηBµ
2e−2µ − (1− ηA)(1− ηB)µ
′2e−2µ
′
] ≤ 0; K ≤ 0 (7)
When both conditions above are met, we have the following inequality for the lower band
of Y11:
Y11 > Y11
L ≡
k(Stµ,µ − S˜
t
00)− (S
nt
µ′,µ′ − S˜
nt
00)
[kηAηBµ2e−2µ − (1− ηA)(1− ηB)µ′2e−2µ
′ ]
. (8)
(since the value of µ and µ′ can be chosen separately, the above conditions can be easily
satisfied in practice,) In particular, in the symmetric case that ηA = ηB = η, the conditions
on Eq. (7) reduce to
µ ≥ (1− η)µ′. (9)
For simplicity, we shall use such a condition for all calculations. Actually, directly applying
Eq. (16) and Eq. (2) of Ref. [15] together with Eq. (1,2) here can also lead to Eq. (8,9).
Then the gain of the two-single-photon pulses for the triggered and non-triggered signals
(µ′) are:
St11 = η
2µ′2e−2µ
′
Y11, (10)
Snt11 = (1− η)
2µ′2e−2µ
′
Y11. (11)
As mentioned above, we use two bases in this protocol, i.e., the Z basis and the X basis.
We use the former to generate real keys, and the latter only for error test. After error test,
we get the bit-flip error rates for the triggered and non-triggered pulses as Etµ,µ and E
nt
µ′,µ′.
In order to calculate the final key rate, we also need to know the phase-flip error rate of
two-single-photon pulses in the Z basis, i.e. eph,t11 (or e
ph,nt
11 ) which is equal to the bit-flip rate
in the X basis, eX,t11 (or e
X,nt
11 ), whose values can be represented as:
eX,t11 6
EX,tµ,µS
X,t
µ,µ − E
X,t
µ,0S
X,t
µ,0 −E
X,t
0,µS
X,t
0,µ + E
X,t
0,0 S
X,t
0,0
Sω,t11
≡ eXa , (12)
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or
eX,nt11 6
EX,ntµ′,µ′S
X,nt
µ′,µ′ − E
X,nt
µ′,0 S
X,nt
µ′,0 − E
X,nt
0,µ′ S
X,nt
0,µ′ + E
X,nt
0,0 S
X,nt
0,0
Sω,nt11
≡ eXb . (13)
Combing the two bounds, we have [23]:
eX11 6 e
X,U
11 = min{e
X
a , e
X
b }. (14)
Now we can calculate the final key generation rate for the triggered signal pulses (µ′) as:
Rt > {q2P 21 (µ
′)Y Z,t11 [1−H2(e
X
11)]− S
Z,t
µ′,µ′f(E
Z,t
µ′,µ′)H2(E
Z,t
µ′,µ′)}, (15)
where f(Eµ′) is a factor for the cost of error correction given existing error correction systems
in practice, and we assume f = 1.16 here [12]. H2 (x) is the binary Shannon information
function, given by
H2 (x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
We have not considered the effects of bases mismatch in BB84 protocol. Actually, one can
choose basis in a biased way [26] and the effect can vanish asymptotically. In fact, the non-
triggered events and the triggered events from weaker fields can also be used to distill secret
keys as shown in [22]. However, for simplicity, in the following simulations we consider only
the triggered components from the stronger field.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
With formulas above, we can now numerically calculate the key rate and compare the
secret key generation rate of our new MDI-QKD scheme with existing methods [12, 15].
Moreover, we will show the different results of our proposed scheme using different HSPSs,
i.e., in poisson or thermal distributions. Below for simplicity, we assume that the UTP
locates in the middle of Alice and Bob, and the UTP’s detectors are identical, i.e., they have
the same dark count rate and detection efficiency, and their detection efficiency does not
depend on the incoming signals.
We shall estimate what values would probably be observed for the gains and error rates
in the normal cases by the linear model [12, 24] where state |n〉〈n| from Alice changes to
n∑
k=0
Cknη
k(1− η)n−k|k〉〈k|, (16)
8
TABLE I: Parameters used in numerical simulations: α is the channel loss, ed is the misalignment
probability, dc and ηc are the dark count rate and the detection efficiency per detector at the UTP’s
side, respectively.
where η is the transmittance from Alice to the UTP. Using this model, we can set values
(probably would-be observed values in experiments) for Stxy, S
nt
xy, E
t
xy and E
nt
xy according
to transmission distance. After setting these values, we can find the distance dependent
key rate by Eq. (15). For this purpose, we have developed a general model to simulate
the probably observed gains and error rates and hence the final key rate under linearly loss
channel, given whatever source state[24].
For a fair comparison, we use the same parameters as in [12, 25], see Table I, except that
Alice (Bob) uses an extra detector for heralding signals with a detection efficiency of ηA (ηB)
and dark count rate of dA (dB).
In practical implementations, people often use a non-degenerate PDC process and obtain
a visible and a telecommunication wavelength in mode T and S, respectively. To simplify the
simulations, we assume both Alice and Bob have the same silicon avalanche photodiodes. We
do calculation for the conditions of detection ηA = ηB = 0.75 (or 0.9), and dA = dB = 10
−6.
At each distance, in order to maximize the key generation rate, we set µ = (1 − η)µ′ and
use the optimal µ′ for the case of using both triggered and non-triggered events, for other
cases we set µ = 0.1 and use the optimal value of µ′. Our simulation results are shown in
Figs. 2 - 4.
Fig. 2(a) displays the comparison of the final key generation rate between different
schemes. The curve W0 is the case of using infinite decoy states with WCS [12], W1 repre-
sents Wang’s three decoy-state method with WCSs [15], H01 (or H02) shows the asymptotic
case with HSPSs, and H1 (or H2) represents the result of our new scheme with triggered
and non-triggered HSPSs. In the simulations above, we use the optimal values of µ′ at each
distance for all the curves. Just the difference is: For the asymptotic cases (W0, H01 and
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FIG. 2: (Color online) (a). Comparison of the final key generation rates vs distance between our
proposed scheme and the ones in Ref. [12] and Ref. [15]. W0: infinite intensities with WCS [12];
W1: three-intensity method with WCSs; H01 and H02: infinite intensities with HSPSs; H1 and
H2: our proposed method with triggered and non-triggered HSPSs. (b). Optimal values of µ′ for
each curves listed in (a). The WCSs and the HSPSs used here are all in Poisson distribution. We
have chosen the heralding detection efficiency to be 0.9 for curve H01 and H1, and 0.75 for curve
H02 and H2.
H02), the fraction of two-single-photon counts and the QBER of two-single-photon pulses
are known exactly; For the normal three decoy-state case (W1), we use the parameters
shown in Table I and assume a reasonable value for µ (0.1); While for our new scheme (H1
and H2), we use the same parameters as in Table I except that ηA = ηB = 0.9 (or 0.75), and
borrowing the relationship of µ and µ′ from Eq. (9). Fig. 2(b) shows corresponding optimal
values of µ′ for each curve in Fig. 2(a). Besides, The WCSs and HSPSs used here are all in
poisson distributions.
Fig. 3(a) and (b) are the comparison of our new MDI-QKD scheme with normal three
decoy-state method [15] using HSPSs. Fig. 3(a) shows the the final key generation rate vs
transmission distance, and Fig. 3(b) corresponds to the optimal values of µ′. The curve
H0 and H1 each corresponds to the asymptotic case with infinite decoy states and our new
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FIG. 3: (Color online) (a). Comparison of the final key generation rates with HSPSs using different
methods. H0: infinite intensities. H1: a few intensities of this work. H2: key rates of a few
intensities using triggered events in sources of intensity µ and µ′ to calculate Y11 [15]. The HSPSs
used here are all in poisson distributions. (b). Corresponding optimal values of µ′ for all the lines
in (a). We have chosen all heralding detection efficiencies to be 0.75.
scheme, respectively. H2 represents the result of using normal three decoy-state method.
Here the HSPSs used are all in poisson distributions.
Fig. 4(a) and (b) describe the different behavior of our new MDI-QKD scheme when
using HSPSs in different distributions. The curve H0 and H1 each represents the result of
using infinite decoy-state method and our new scheme, respectively, and both using HSPSs
in poisson distributions. While the lines T0 and T1 correspond to the results of with thermal
distributions.
From the comparison above we find that:
(i). Our new scheme of using triggered and non-triggered signals can work excellently
close to the asymptotic case with infinite decoy-state method as in Fig 2(a) and (b). This
is due to the precise estimation of the tight bounds of Y11 and e11 by using both triggered
and non-triggered signals.
(ii). Our new MDI-QKD scheme with HSPSs can transmit a much longer distance com-
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FIG. 4: (Color online) (a). Comparison of the final key generation rates of MDI-QKD with HSPSs
in different photon-number distributions. H0: infinite intensities, Poisson distribution. H1: a few
intensities of this work, Poisson distribution; T0: infinite intensities, thermal distribution, T1: a
few intensities of this work, thermal distribution. We have chosen all heralding detection efficiencies
to be 0.75.
pared with the one with WCSs (> 70km here) as shown in Fig. 2(a), which benefits from
the substantial low vacuum components in the heralded signals.
(iii). In our new scheme, the HSPSs in poisson distributions show similar key generation
rates as WCSs at short distances, and much higher key rates at long distances as shown in
Fig. 2(a). This is attributed to a much higher optimal value of µ′ being used as shown in
Fig. 2(b).
(iv) According to our calculation here, the protocol using Eq.(8) can have a higher key
rate than the one using only triggered events, as shown in Fig. 3(a), because of a much
higher optimal value of µ′ being used as shown in Fig. 3(b).
(v) Similar to Ref. [17, 27], the HSPS source in poisson distribution has better perfor-
mance than the one in thermal distribution as shown in Fig. 4(a) and (b). This is because
the poisson distribution has a higher single-photon probability.
In all our calculations, we did not normalize the triggered or non-triggered states, e.g.,
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Eq.(1,2). Hence the gains and the key rates calculated here are in the unit of the rate
averaged over all pumped events of certain intensity in a certain basis. For example, in H/V
basis, there are N ′z times that both Alice and Bob used stronger pump lights. Among these
events, they obtain N ′tn events of triggering at both sides and n
′
tz times of successful events.
Then the the gain in our definition is n′tz/N
′
z. If we want the key rate averaged over number
of triggered states, our results in each figures becomes several times larger, since it should
be multiplied by a factor 1/F and F is the normalization factor.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In summary, we have studied the decoy-state MDI-QKD with heralded single photon
source. We show that this proposed implementation offers a longer transmission distance
compared with existing realization methods. Therefore, it looks promising for practical
applications in the future.
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